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Abstract
Background: More than 6,800 rare diseases and conditions have been identified in the US, which affect 25–30
million Americans. In 1983, the US Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) to encourage the development
and marketing of drugs to treat rare diseases and conditions. This study analyzed all orphan designations and FDA
approvals since 1983 through 2015, discussed the effectiveness of incentives for the development of treatments for
rare diseases, and reflected on the ethical imperatives for timely access to orphan drugs.
Methods: Study data were derived from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Orange Book and the Office of
Orphan Drugs Development. A search was conducted to assess literature on the ethical principles and economic
incentives for the development of orphan drugs.
Results: In the period 1983–2015, the FDA granted 3,647 orphan drug designations and 554 orphan drug
approvals. The orphan drug approvals corresponded to 438 different brand names. Cancer was the therapeutic area
with the highest number of approvals. The increased number of patients with rare diseases and the growth in the
cost of orphan drugs pose a significant economic burden for patients, public programs and private third party
payers. Regulatory differences to qualify for orphan designation and various population thresholds employed by the
FDA and the European Medicines Agency lead to further unmet health needs for patients with rare diseases and
aggravate health inequities. There is no societal consensus on the population and economic thresholds, the drug
effectiveness indicator(s), or the societal value to be placed for the approval and reimbursement of orphan drugs.
Conclusion: Orphan drug development and marketing in the US concentrate in few therapeutic areas. Despite the
increase in the number of FDA approved orphan drugs, the unmet needs of patients with rare diseases evidence
that the current incentives are not efficiently stimulating orphan drug development. There is need to balance
economic incentives to stimulate the development and marketing of orphan drugs without jeopardizing patients’
access to treatment. Thus, aligning pharmaceutical companies’ incentives with societal budgetary constraints is
necessary and the ethical imperatives of timely access to orphan drugs need to be agreed upon.
Keywords: Orphan drugs, Rare diseases, Orphan diseases, Research and development, FDA, Economic incentives,
Ethical aspects
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Background
Chronic conditions such as heart disease, stroke, cancer,
diabetes, and arthritis affect millions of patients in the
United States (US) [1]. These prevalent diseases have
traditionally attracted significant research and economic
resources from public and private institutions, organiza-
tions and pharmaceutical companies. Simultaneously, a
large number of diseases and conditions afflict a rela-
tively small number of patients. As of March 18, 2016,
the National Institutes of Health Genetic and Rare
Disease Information Center have listed more than 6,800
rare diseases and conditions in the US, which affect an
estimated 25–30 million Americans [2, 3]. Approxi-
mately, 250 new rare diseases and conditions are
described each year [4]. Growing attention has been
given to ultra-rare diseases (i.e., disease or condition that
affects a small number of patients in the US), [5–8]. Al-
though there is no consensus yet on the definition of an
ultra-rare disease, the concept has been applied in the
literature to diseases that have a prevalence of <1 per
50,000 persons [9].
Most modern societies consider an ethical imperative
to ensure patients’ access to drugs for the prevention
and treatment of severe and life-threatening diseases.
Historically, research and development (R&D) efforts fo-
cused on the most prevalent diseases and conditions.
Only recently, attention has turned to a growing number
of rare diseases that affect a large combined number of
patients and require new and improved treatment alter-
natives for addressing patients’ unmet health needs.
Regulatory initiatives and R&D efforts during the past
three decades resulted in the development and approval
of a significant number of drugs for rare diseases and
conditions (i.e. orphan drugs). While orphan drugs im-
prove the health status and quality of life of patients, the
cost of new orphan drugs also limit patients’ access to
treatment.
This study analyzed all orphan designations and US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approvals since
the enactment of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) in 1983
through December 31, 2015, discussed the effectiveness
of incentives for development and marketing of treat-
ments for rare diseases and conditions and patients’ bar-
riers to access orphan drugs, and reflected on the ethical
imperatives for timely access to orphan drugs in the
current context of its societal value.
In spite of the significant increase in the number of
orphan drugs approved by the FDA since the enactment
of the ODA in 1983 and the faster than the economy
increases in orphan drug prices, the economics of the
orphan drug market remain controversial among some
scholars and stakeholders. Given the growing number of
rare and ultra-rare diseases, the overall rising cost of
healthcare and stretched budgets to cover rare disease
treatment, this study has the potential to enrich and ap-
praise the current debate on the ethical imperatives of
providing timely access to orphan drugs. A comprehen-
sive understanding of the ethical considerations of access
to safe and effective orphan drugs is essential as research
continues related to the regulation of drug development
for rare diseases and to the implementation of public
policies that may impact treatment affordability.
Methods
Study data were derived from the FDA Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (i.e.
Orange Book-OB) versions from 1983–2015, the elec-
tronic version of the OB, the FDA OOPD List of Orphan
Designations and Approvals, documents and data from
the FDA's website. Data were updated through December
31, 2015. Study data included all orphan designations and
approvals/licenses listed by the FDA since the enactment
of the ODA in 1983 through December 31, 2015.
A PubMed and EconLit search of peer-reviewed pa-
pers on the incentives for the development of orphan
drugs and the ethical dilemmas to be considered when
funding research and treatment for rare diseases and
conditions was conducted using the search terms “or-
phan drugs” OR “rare diseases” AND "access" OR "price"
OR "cost" OR "incentives" OR "ethics", with limits for
English language, publication from 1983–2016. Our
search defined, a priori, a set of criteria for selecting
studies, assessing the methodologic quality of those
studies, and synthesizing the evidence across studies.
Criteria for inclusion or exclusion of retrieved articles
were determined before the literature search; article
review was conducted independently by 2 reviewers.
Manuscripts were excluded if they were: 1) not pub-
lished in English or as full-length peer-reviewed manu-
scripts (e.g. letters to the editor, commentary or point of
view), 2) primarily assessed safety or effectiveness of or-
phan drugs, 3) duplicate articles, 4) focused on societal
willingness to pay, 5) case studies for particular diseases
or 6) updated in a more recent article. References cited
in the retained articles were reviewed for additional arti-
cles. Overall, of 262 articles retrieved, 24 articles were
retained. Data were qualitatively assessed following a
structured and standardized approach. A standardized
data abstraction form, using a spreadsheet template in
excel, and a checklist were developed and utilized by the
authors to assess retrieved manuscripts. The data ab-
straction form included study question, study design and
characteristics of studies including year when the study
was conducted and country, study population, sample
size, patient demographics and assessed clinical condi-
tion(s), perspective of the analysis, and study findings.
Two authors abstracted information from studies inde-
pendently. The results from the data abstraction were
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compared only after completing the review of the arti-
cles. Discrepancies between authors were resolved by
the third author.
Results
Patients’ unmet health needs
The lack of clinical alternatives for the prevention and
treatment of rare diseases and conditions has been at-
tributed to the difficulty of recovering the R&D cost due
to the small size of the population and potential for
profits. In response to those concerns, in 1983, the US
Congress enacted the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) to
encourage the development and marketing of drugs to
treat rare diseases and conditions [10]. Orphan drug sta-
tus initially applied to products whose sales in the US
market would not cover the costs incurred during prod-
uct development. In 1984, the ODA amendment ex-
panded the definition of orphan drugs to include drugs
for any disease or condition that affect less than 200,000
persons in the US [11].
The US and the European Union (EU) use different
methods and population thresholds to determine if a
drug qualifies for orphan designation. The US Food and
Drugs Administration (FDA) uses the prevalence of the
disease (i.e. number of people that have the disease),
while the European Medicines Agency (EMA) uses the
prevalence proportion (i.e. proportion of people in the
population that have the disease). In the EU, the preva-
lence of the condition must not be more than 5 in
10,000 persons [12]. Employing the disease prevalence
instead of a disease prevalence proportion means that as
the population grows, a smaller percentage of the popu-
lation will need to be impacted by a rare disease in order
for a drug to qualify for the orphan drug legal provi-
sions. On January 1, 1984 a drug for a disease affecting
less than 1 in 1,174 Americans would had qualified for
orphan designation based on the 200,000 patient popula-
tion threshold - authors’ estimations using data from the
US Census Bureau, 2016. On January 1, 2016, a disease
must affect less than 1 in 1,615 Americans to qualify for
such orphan designation. Therefore, the use of disease
prevalence conflicts with the overall concept of vertical
justice of health as the regulatory arbitrary cut-off point
will continue to proportionally exclude rarer diseases
and conditions over time. Conversely, it is expected that
a growing population will lead to the identification of
more rare diseases and thus, additional health care needs
will have to be addressed with fewer resources for each
condition.
The ODA has been credited to result in a significant
increase in the number of drug approvals for rare dis-
eases and conditions [13, 14]. In the period 1983–2015,
the FDA granted 3,647 orphan drug designations and
554 orphan drug approvals (Fig. 1). The orphan drug
approvals correspond to 438 different brand names; 53
branded drugs had more than 1 orphan approval (range
2–6). The orphan drug approvals targeted 277 rare
diseases. There were 191 diseases with 1 orphan desig-
nation and 86 diseases with two or more orphan desig-
nations. Cancer was the therapeutic area with the
highest number of approvals (177 orphan approvals,
31.9% of the total number of orphan approvals), followed
by infectious diseases excluding HIV (46, 8.3%),
hemophilia and other bleeding disorders (32, 5.8%), HIV
and related comorbidities (19, 3.4%), growth failure (13,
2.3%), pulmonary arterial hypertension (12, 2.2%), and
transplant related designations (11, 2.0%). Other thera-
peutic classes had 244 orphan approvals representing
44.0% of the total approvals [15]. Individuals living with
rare diseases often experience delays in diagnosis, mis-
diagnosis, and psychological and economic stress [16].
Physicians may lack needed clinical knowledge about
rare diseases and available treatments leading to delayed
diagnosis and inadequate care. In a survey of 5,980
patients and patient caregivers living in 17 European
countries, assessing eight prevalent rare diseases, Kole &
Faurisson found that 41% of orphan disease patients re-
ceived at least one incorrect diagnosis prior to receiving
a proper diagnosis [16]. Furthermore, patient’s care
mainly focuses on managing symptoms instead of holis-
tically addressing the patient health care needs.
Economic incentives for the development and marketing
of orphan drugs
Under the provisions of the ODA (1983) economic in-
centives to develop and market orphan drugs, include
grant funding for academic-based researchers or com-
panies, tax credits for expenditures incurred during the
clinical trials phase, waivers of the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (1992) filing fees, and a seven-year market
exclusivity for FDA-designated orphan drug indications.
During the orphan market exclusivity period, the FDA
cannot approve a new drug application or a generic drug
application for the same product and for the same rare
disease indication. In the EU, the European Parliament
adopted the Orphan Drug Regulation 141/2000 [10] that
provides similar market incentives to encourage develop-
ment of orphan drugs.
There is a risk that developing orphan drugs for low
prevalence rare diseases and consequently small market
size is less attractive for the pharmaceutical industry [6].
Prior research found a modest impact of the ODA
seven-year orphan drug market exclusivity provisions.
The orphan drug market exclusivity provision increased
the effective patent life of orphan new molecular entities
(i.e., a new drug containing an active ingredient that has
never before been approved for marketing in the US) by
an average of 0.8 years [17]. Nevertheless, orphan drugs
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represent an increasingly important component of the
pharmaceutical market. The orphan drug market repre-
sented approximately 22% of total pharmaceutical sales
in 2010 with a mean per year economic value per drug
of US$637 million [18]. The return of the investment in
an orphan drug exceeds the return of the investment in
a non-orphan drug (8.4% and 2.3%, respectively) [19].
The excess in the return of the investment is even
greater when the drugs are brought to the market
(30.1% and 17.1% for orphan and non-orphan drugs, re-
spectively) [19]. Furthermore, orphan drugs can bring in
significant revenues for pharmaceutical companies in
global sales, [20] raising criticisms of high treatment
costs of orphan drug products [21] and challenging the
assumption that developing orphan drugs without public
support is not profitable for pharmaceutical companies.
Current incentives to develop and market orphan
drugs do not promote long-term innovation [22] or ad-
dress some of the pressing concerns regarding treatment
affordability for patients and third party payers [23]. In
addition, patients may end up paying twice for the same
drug through public funds to develop orphan drugs and
the cost of treatment [17]. Therefore, there is need to
balance economic incentives to stimulate development
and marketing of orphan drugs without threating af-
fordability. Despite the significant increase in the
number of FDA approved orphan drugs during the
last three decades, the unmet needs of rare disease
patients suggest that the current financial incentives
are not efficiently stimulating orphan drug develop-
ment and marketing [17, 24].
Barriers to access treatment for rare diseases
The cost of care for rare diseases poses an important
economic burden to patients, third party payers and the
society at large. The average annual direct health care
cost per patient with rare diseases varies significantly by
patient and disease characteristics [25]. In general, the
cost of orphan drugs exceeds the cost paid for drugs for
common diseases and the standard thresholds used to
determine the cost-effectiveness of drugs [26]. In the US,
estimations of the average annual direct health care cost
per patient range from $118,293 (2005 USD) to
$161,441 (2003 USD) for hemophilia [27], $63,127 (2006
USD) for cystic fibrosis [28], and $28,590 (2012 USD)
for the Duchenne muscular dystrophy [29]. Inpatient
care and prescription drugs are the main health care
cost components related to rare diseases treatment cost.
Concerns have been raised about the high prices of or-
phan drugs [13, 18, 20, 30]. The price of orphan drugs is
often the most significant barrier for patients to access
care. Life-threatening health conditions and the lack of
therapeutic alternatives creates an inelastic demand for
orphan drugs leading to high prices in a market with
already limited competition. The current reimbursement
of orphan drugs on an exceptional basis may not be
economically sustainable due to the existing budget
constraints and the growing number of orphan drugs
approved by the FDA [26].
The societal value of orphan drugs
The societal value of orphan drugs can be framed by a var-
iety of ethical constructs. If society wishes to maximize
total net benefits, in line with a classic utilitarian doctrine
(i.e., maximize utility for the greatest number of individ-
uals in society), the cost-benefit ratio of rare diseases may
be less favorable to receive public funding as they would
in an egalitarian approach (i.e., maximize equality of indi-
viduals) [31]. The goal of achieving an egalitarian outcome
can be based on reaching a predetermined threshold of
Fig. 1 FDA Orphan Drug Designations and Approvals, 1983–2015
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health, a general prioritization of the worst off, or amount
of resources for an individual [31]. Thus, an egalitarian
doctrine would provide a greater foundation for public
funding for orphan drugs development and treatment
coverage for rare diseases. Alternatively, the rule of rescue,
or the ability to intervene if a treatment becomes available,
may also provide a justification for funding rare disease
treatments with public resources. This argument presup-
poses that rare disease patients will have timely access and
will be positively impacted by these treatments [32].
The ethics of the resource allocation to funding or-
phan drugs has been discussed but not agreed upon in
the literature [22, 33–35]. There is no societal consensus
related to whether or not the size of the patient popula-
tion, in itself, is a justifiable factor in employing distinct
measures of effectiveness and economic evaluation (e.g.
cost-effectiveness) for the approval and reimbursement
of orphan drugs. While some authors argue that the spe-
cial status argument for public funding and reimburse-
ment of orphan drugs does not stand up to critical
assessment [34], others have strengthened the import-
ance of using economic evaluation, political debate [23],
and social dialogue [23, 35] to balance distributive just-
ice to orphan drug development and access. Further, the
outcome measure of effectiveness, whether premature
mortality, quality adjusted life years, achieving a mini-
mum acceptable life expectancy, or any other proposed
metrics remains unclear [22, 34].
The average treatment cost is often skewed by a small
proportion of patients requiring a large amount of health
care resources [25, 36]. In addition, making inferences
about the average cost per patient or per rare disease is
challenging due to the high-degree of variability in the
health care needs, and the type and cost of treatment.
These considerations, may also vary on an individual
level, at which point the argument is no longer looking
at a potentially favored group, but prioritizing one pa-
tient over another, which runs counter to egalitarian
concepts [34].
The role of identifiability of the patient population is
also a component of the rule of rescue when making de-
cisions about allocation of resources to rare diseases
[31]. Patient registries and genetic screening, when avail-
able, are becoming increasingly more common to help
identify patients. Patient registries provide valuable but
also sensitive data, and thus, require patient privacy pro-
tections and a thorough understanding of the ethical
and legal implications of proprietary use of medical data.
All orphan drug patient registries are subject to federal
privacy protections in the US. However, the rare disease
population may be more vulnerable when it comes to
protecting patient privacy as the small population af-
fected, and often distinctive characteristics of the condi-
tions, make potentially easier to identify individuals [37].
In addition, data ownership becomes challenging for rare
diseases as the partnership models for registries are
often more complex and the data have the potential to
lead to more profitable treatments. Efforts have been led
by government agencies, patient organizations, and inde-
pendent health organizations in the US and Europe to
outline best practices for patient registries [37].
Ethical imperatives for timely access to orphan drugs
Orphan drugs are often for treatment of life-threatening
diseases. In this context, the right to life may be con-
structed as the right to health. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, proclaimed by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in 1948 established the right to life co-
dified in the European Convention on Human Rights
(1950) [38]. Constitutional rights in western countries
often include the right to life as one of the fundamental
moral principles. The right to the “highest attainable
standard of health” was first depicted in 1946 in the
Constitution of the World Health Organization [39]. Since
then, the right to health has been included in several inter-
national treaties and declarations and it is protected
constitutionally in most developed economies with the
notable exception of the US [40]. The European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the right to life as
protecting the need for medical care [38].
The ECHR addressed the need for orphan drug treat-
ment funding in Nitecki vs. Poland (2002) [41]. Nitecki,
a Polish National with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
challenged Poland’s refusal to refund the full cost of his
drug under his right to life under Article 2 of the
Convention of Human Rights. The ECHR found that the
case was not a violation of the Convention of Human
Rights, although the ECHR asserted this was due to the
government’s funding already more than two-thirds of
the treatment cost.
Rare diseases often result in disability. The Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by
the United Nations (UN) in 2006, echoed and expanded
upon the ideas articulated in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1950) by recognizing the right to
enjoy “the highest attainable standard of health without
discrimination on the basis of disability” [42]. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights afforded all of
the rights and freedoms “without distinction of any kind,
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.” Nevertheless, protections for
people with disabilities was not fully articulated until
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabil-
ities in 2006.
In 2009, the Council of the European Union (EU) ap-
proved the conclusions of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities (2006) and it was ratified in
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2011 [43]. EU country members also enacted their own
regulations related to disability. Although, the US signed
the Convention in 2009, Congress has yet to ratify the
document [43]. In the US, the most relevant disability le-
gislation is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of
1990 [44]. The ADA definition of a person with a dis-
ability is “a person who has a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, a person who has a history or record of such
an impairment, or a person who is perceived by others
as having such an impairment” [44]. Further, individuals
with severe rare diseases may qualify for additional pro-
tections and access to care under the US Social Security
Act [45]. Neither of these regulations or their subse-
quent amendments list the conditions that are consid-
ered disabilities.
In the US, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 implemented comprehensive health insur-
ance reforms to improve health care coverage [46]. Al-
though, rare diseases and orphan products are explicitly
mentioned in the law, in the context of clinical trials and
orphan product exclusions from other pharmaceutical
sales regulation, the coverage of orphan drugs is not
addressed in the Act.
Country specific court cases have led to a broad inter-
pretation of national legislation in support of patient’s
rights to health care [47] including treatment when no
therapeutic alternative exist. Court cases may support
patients’ rights to health and health care in cases where
clear guidelines are not codified by law and individuals
are denied access to treatment. The judicial review ap-
proach focuses on challenging regulations, policies and
administrative decisions related to specific patient cases
that may be considered violations of the constitutional
and legal framework. In R (on the application of Rogers)
vs. Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust and another
(2006) [48], for example, the England and Wales Court
of Appeals found that while it would be rational to deny
treatment to a lone individual, denying treatment to pa-
tients, who could all potentially benefit from the drug,
was irrational. In this case, the Court of Appeals believed
that by not considering the funding as an element of
coverage, there was uniformity amongst all of the pa-
tients that made inconsistencies irrational. Other judicial
cases also supported patient’s rights to treatment as in
the case of R (on the application of Otley) vs. Barking
and Dagenham NHS Primary Care Trust of 2007) [49].
Otley suffered from colorectal cancer and she was de-
nied treatment coverage. The Court ruled that there
were no other potential drug treatments and the clinical
trial results were not exhaustive to preclude the poten-
tial for drug effectiveness in her case since the drug
effectiveness was based on the clinical trial for other
patients in her patient cohort.
Discussion
Rare disease patients and their families encounter health
and financial barriers in the availability of diagnostic, pre-
vention and treatment alternatives, coverage for existing
care, general awareness in society and the healthcare
system about rare diseases, and access to educational re-
sources for their own comprehension of their condition.
In spite of the increase in approvals, marketed orphan
drugs address only a fraction of the large number of rare
diseases and conditions that affect millions of patients’
worldwide showing that the unmet needs of the rare
disease patient population remain a challenge. Treatment
alternatives for rare diseases are limited and health inequi-
ties are persistent; some rare diseases have several thera-
peutic alternatives approved and marketed; whereas, for
other rare diseases, there is currently little, if any, research
or investment into potential orphan drugs.
In the study period, the diseases with the highest num-
ber of FDA orphan drug approvals were hemophilia
(including all types of A and B) and acute lymphoblastic
leukemia. Cancer is increasingly targeted for orphan
drug approvals [17, 35, 50]. This could be a trend to-
wards more stratified medicine [35] or an attempt by the
industry to utilize ODA incentives to approve oncology
drugs for orphan drug indications that once approved,
are often used off-label [51].
Aligning pharmaceutical company incentives with so-
cietal budgetary constraints is necessary. Orphan drugs
can be profitable even in rare diseases with very small
number of patients. The increased number of orphan
drug patients and faster than inflation growth in costly
orphan drugs pose an economic burden for patients,
public programs and private third party payers. Still, the
allocation of resources to balance societal priorities has
not being addressed in a comprehensive way.
Despite the legislative evidence that there is a commit-
ment to provide a level of care to individuals with rare
diseases, there is not a comprehensive moral or ethical
justification for the allocation of these resources codified
in our societal context. Issues of distributive justice and
egalitarian principles of equitable healthcare provide
some basis to treat these conditions, but as the number
of conditions and treatment cost continue to grow, there
are no clear ethical mandates related to how to address
the long-term problem.
At the nexus of this complex regulatory, ethical,
economic and clinical issue, it remains unresolved the
economic incentives and ethical imperatives trade-offs in
strengthening access to safe, effective and affordable treat-
ments for patients with rare diseases. The dearth of infor-
mation on the patients’ health status and overall costs of
rare diseases prior to patients gaining access to orphan
drugs makes it challenging to assess the cost-effectiveness
of orphan drugs. Thus, balancing the cost of economic
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incentives for the development of orphan drugs against
the overall benefits and improvements in health outcomes
remains of critical importance [17, 23, 33, 40, 52]. Other-
wise, there is a risk of aggravating market failures and
perpetuating inefficiencies.
The literature has interrogated questions at the per-
iphery of this issue and assessed the merits of the
Orphan Drug Act of 1983. A robust analysis of the pol-
icy outcomes has yet to be completed, namely, there is
need for empirical evidence of the orphan drug treat-
ment costs, its effectiveness and the long-term benefits
for patients and the society at large. On the other hand,
the concerns related to innovation of products and
equating incentives for pharmaceutical companies to the
societal value of orphan drugs will continue to be a
daunting policy challenge. Even if a society could agree
on the societal value of orphan drugs, there are add-
itional patient needs and treatment costs associated with
individuals reaching certain, accepted upon, health status
beyond the cost of a drug.
Study findings must be interpreted with caution given
the heterogeneity of the drugs approved for orphan indi-
cations. Orphan designations are granted to a large
number of drugs that treat rare diseases and conditions
that may be very different by nature. The cost of treat-
ment and clinical outcomes may also vary considerably
across and within rare diseases. Despite these challenges
orphan drugs often represent the only hope for patients
and their families. Thus, the development and marketing
of safe and effective treatments remains critical to ad-
dress the health needs of the rare disease community.
Conclusion
It is often difficult for those in the rare disease community
to not trumpet the success of the ODA, based on the in-
crease in the orphan drug designations and FDA approvals
after 1983. However, over 30 years later, we are still using
the benchmark of a 20th century framework to measure
our success. Advocates are reluctant to point out any flaws
based on the fear of stifling innovation, but with over
6,500 diseases needing treatment, there is evidence to sug-
gest patients’ unmet health needs remains a concern and
more effective incentives have to be implemented. There
is an ethical imperative of addressing patients with rare
diseases access to orphan drugs.
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